Belief revision and belief update are two dif ferent forms of belief change, and they serve different purposes. In this paper we focus on belief update, the formalization of change in beliefs due to changes in the world. The complex ity of the basic update (introduced by Winslett [1990] ) has been determined in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992] . Since then, many other formaliza tions have been proposed to overcome the lim itations and drawbacks of Winslett's update. In this paper we analyze the complexity of the proposals presented in the literature, and relate some of them to previous work on closed world reasoning.
Introduction
The study of belief change has received considerable at tention from the AI, databases and philosophy commu nities. Belief change deals with the incorporation of new facts into an agent's beliefs. There are two basic forms of belief change: belief revision and belief update. The difference lies in what is the source of incorrectness (if any) in the previous agent's beliefs.
The old beliefs of the agent may be mistaken or in complete: in this case the usual approach is that of belief revision, captured by the AGM postulates [Alchourr6n et a/., 1985] . On the other hand, an agent's beliefs, while correct at one time, may become obsolete due to changes in the world. The basic treatment of updates is given in [Winslett, 1990] , while a general framework is proposed in [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991] .
Many drawbacks and limitations of the initial proposal of Winslett have been discovered. One regards how it treats disjunctive information: as in many approaches of non-monotonic reasoning, the update treats incorrectly a new piece of information that is in disjunctive form (such as x 1 V X 2 ). The next example shows one of these situations. Another drawback of the original formulation of up date is that it never allows changes to the previous states: sometimes updates lead agents to revise their knowledge about the previous state. In these cases, update is re lated with revision as intended in the AGM framework [Alchourr6n et a/., 1985; Dalai, 1988] . The next exam ple, shamelessly stolen from [Boutilier, 1995] In this paper we analyze the complexity of some of the proposals introduced so far. The complexity of the PMA approach (Possible Models Approach, also known as Winsiett's update) has been proved by Eiter and Gottlob [1992] to be at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, namely II 2 . The problem considered there is the basic entailment, that is given a knowledge base Φ, an update u and a propositions] formula ψ, decide whether ψ is implied by w, the updated knowledge base
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we give the basic definitions of propositional calculus, belief update, and the various definitions of update pro posed so fax. In section 3 we study the updates proposed for solving the problem of disjunctive updates: we start showing how some of the semantics of update are related to previous work on closed world reasoning, and use the results on complexity of closed world reasoning to prove some complexity results of update. In section 4 we show the complexity of the remaining proposals. In section 5 we draw some conclusions.
Definitions
Throughout this paper, we assume a propositional lan guage C over an alphabet of atoms X. Any piece of information (such as previous agents' beliefs, updates, etc.) is represented by a propositional formula, where not otherwise specified. An interpretation is a truth as signment of the atoms, that is, a function from atoms into the set {true,false}. We extend this assignment to propositional formulas in the usual way. An inter pretation I is a model of a formula Φ if and only if the formula is true in that interpretation. We denote inter pretations and models by sets of atoms (those mapped into true). The set of all the possible interpretations over the given alphabet is denoted by M. A formula is said to be complete if it has exactly one model. Given a formula Φ, we denote by Var Φ the set of atoms it contains.
Possible Causes Approach
This approach was proposed in [Li and Pereira, 1996] and is based upon the idea that changes in the world are caused by actions. Thus, update can be formalized with ad-hoc languages such as A (introduced in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1993] ) with an appropriate semantics. The main difference between reasoning about actions and belief update formalisms is that in the formers, actions are often assumed to be known in advance, and the aim of the theory is to understand what is true after they are performed. In belief update, actions are always assumed unknown, and the only evidence they have happened is their consequences.
The language A is built over an alphabet composed of fluent names (that are the facts, or what in the previous formalizations are the atoms of the propositional language), and three special symbols after, causes and if. A fluent expression is a fluent name or a fluent name preceded b¬y . are fluent expressions. If m = 0 the after proposition F after A\,..., A m is writ ten initially F, and is called initially proposition.
In order to formalize the belief update in this framework, we must introduce a finite set of (linearly or dered) temporal points T, and two other kinds of propo sitions, the happens propositions and the holds proposi tions. Given a time point t and an action A, a happens proposition is written A happens at t, and means that the action A happens in the instant t. Given a fluent expression F and a time point t, a holds proposition has the form F holds at t, and means that F is true in the time point t.
A domain description is a set of value, effect, and hap pens propositions. Given a domain description D, it may happen that new information, represented by a holds proposition H, has to be incorporated. Due to the lack of space, we cannot introduce formally the semantics of A neither that of the belief update based on it. We refer to [Li and Pereira, 1996] , where the update is introduced, for a more detailed explanation. The new holds proposi tion H could be not implied by D. In this case, we must find an explanation, i.e., a possible cause of the change. Formally, an explanation is a set of happens and initially propositions P such that D U P implies H. To decide whether a proposition H' is implied by the updated de scription, we check whether D U P implies H' for each minimal explanation P.
Closed World Reasoning
In the sequel we use two formalizations of the closed world assumption, namely the generalized world closed assumption and the CURB. Given a propositional formula μ, the set of its free for negation atoms, written FFN(μ), is the set of the atoms that are false in all the minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) models of μ. The generalized closed world assumption of μ is the formula GCWA(μ) = μ A FFN(μ).
The CURB is introduced in [Eiter et a/., 1993] as a variant of the circumscription. In this paper we use a simplified version of it, the CURB 1 , also introduced in the paper above. Given a formula μ, the CURB 1 (μ) is defined as the formula whose models are the models J of μ such that there exists a set of minimal models S of μ such that a) J contains all the models of S, and b) there is no other J 1 of μ, contained in J, with the same property.
Computational Complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of computational complexity. We use the stan dard notation of complexity classes that can be found in [Johnson, 1990] . Namely, the class P denotes the set of problems whose solution can be found in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine, while NP de notes the class of problems that can be resolved in poly nomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machine. The class coNP denotes the set of decision problems whose complement is in NP. We call NP-hard a problem G if c. Explanations are composed only of after proposi tions (initially propositions are not allowed in ex planations).
In the holds propositions F holds at t we allow F to be a boolean formula on the alphabet of the fluent names (instead of a fluent expression). Under these restrictions, the update is still Il 3 complete.
The reason of the increase of the complexity is that, in the Winslett's approach, each model of Φ is updated separately, and this makes easy to verify if the result of an action entails the new piece of information.
Given a model J € Mod(Φ), in order to decide if J € min(Mod(μ), </), we have to check whether Diff(I, J) is minimal. Each element of Diff(I, J) can be interpreted as an action of the kind of (b) above, that changes the value of a literal. As a result, an explanation of the change is a minimal set of actions that maps / into a model of μ. Given a model I and a set of those ac tions, deciding whether the resulting interpretation J is a model of μ is a polynomial problem.
In the PCA, the possible causes affect the initial state D altogether: a possible explanation is a set of propositions P such that D U P implies the new fact to be incorporated. This is more complex than verifying a possible explanation in Winslett's approach.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated some of the seman tics that have been introduced to formalize changes in the world of interest. The complexity of most of them turns out to be at the second level of the polynomial hi erarchy. This is quite a remarkable result: indeed, these frameworks have been proposed to overcome drawbacks and limitations of the original semantics of update intro duced by Winslett, but this does not seem to introduce any increase in the computational complexity.
Two approaches turn out to have a different complex ity than Winslett's. The first is Boutilier's Generalized Update, that is easier (A£ complete), and the second is the Possible Causes Approach by Li and Pereira, that is more difficult (II3 complete). The first one is a gen eralization of Dalal's revision, and has a slightly higher complexity. The reason of the higher complexity of the Possible Causes Approach seems to be the globality of this operator: a change is considered not to affect each single possible initial state, but all the possible initial states altogether. This makes NP complete a subproblem that is polynomial in Winslett's approach.
